Both DNA and what people speak are commonly referred to as IanguI4ges. The analogy holds, at least in the formal sense. Both DNA and human languages encode and transmit information. Both, like beads on astring, form concatenative symbol-systems. Murlder by far is how much further down the scientific road this analogy can carry uso That is the question this chapter tries to answer: 1s there indeed a "language of the genes"? Can linguistic science repair what Collado-Vides (chapter 9) corredly pinpoints as the weak link in current molecular biology-namely, the relative poverty of explanatory roolecular biology, as opposed to descriptive molecular biology7 Modem molecular biology's redudionism comes at a steep price, leaving us chock full of complex visibles but largely bereft of corresponding simple invisibles. Why do the baderial sigma 70 and 54 promoters look this way rather than same other way7 Tobe sure, evolution and physical sdence ultimately fix these answers. Even so, explanation-seeking scientists rightly posit intennediate, theoretical selections to account for such things as a quark's spin, an eledron's valence or, more to the point, aperson'S genes.
However, no is an equaHy correet answer to our fundamental question because, as we shall see, natural languages form a much simpler computational system than the genette code and transcription machinery. In a nutshell, whereas transcription exploits the three-dimensional twists and turns of biochemistry and resembles a general programming language (as noted in chapter 3), in contrast our curren t understanding is that natural language exploits only adjacency as its programming "trick." Adjacency is enough to derive (henee, explain) most of what we see in natural languages. No such corresponding explanation of why the genetic "programming language" looks the way it does has been forthcoming. The conclusion, then, is that the language of the genes is not like a natural language but more like a general prograrnming language, the details of which we still do not fully understand. Ir is akin to looking at the input and output of a spreadsheet and, from that, trying to figure out not only the specific programming language instrudions used but also which prcgrarnming language was used-whether C, Fortran, or Pascal. As Lewontin notes in chapter I, to understand this is probably the most difficult task of reverse engineering that anyone has ever undertaken. If this insight is accurate, it suggests that molecular biologists might do better to study the methods used by "clean-room" programmers to reverse-engineer spreadsheet programs than to try to figure out whether DNA er its transcripHon mechanisms generate certain kinds of non-contexl:-free languages. More specifically, if we search through the space of context-free or non-context-free languages, we are simply searching through the wrang space. For natural languages, this is a spaee of restrided adjacency relations (described later). For the language of the genes, the appropriate representation is not yet clear, but it may be that something like the space of genetic "circuits" is more fitting (see chapters 6 and 13; McAdams and Shapiro, 1995) .
The remainder of this chapter expands these points. First, we review the possible conneetion between the genetic code and fonnal language theory, showing that formal language theory serves as a poor proxy for studying programming languages and naturallanguages and hence is an unlikely candidate for investigating either one. The argument carries over to aHempts to detect various patterns in the genetic code via different kinds of pattem-matching languages. Here (as discussed in chapter 3) many papular algorithms are based on linear string matching, including so-called hidden Markov models. Though such linear models have been successful in mirroring some aspeds of human language, it is crucial to observe that these linear models have largely been successful in rnodeling speech-that is, exacHy that area oE human language that is strictly linear and left-to-right. Second, we turn to the differences between genetic transcription and natural languages, demonstrating how much simpler naturallanguages are than DNA transcription. We also demonstrate that by using a more appropriate representaHon-defined aver four natural configurations such as subjeet-one can build better search rouHnes for natural Ianguage patterns. Finally, we argue that the language of the genes might best be expressible as a prograrnming language or same such constraint system, perhaps like the genetic circuits discussed elsewhere in this book. Ihis is an area for future research.
FORMAL, NATURAL, AND BIOLOGlCAL LANGUAGES Because DNA ;5 a formal language, there is a natural temptation to wheel out the armamentarium of fonnallanguage theory, but can forrnallanguage theory help us understand DNA7 Ta answer this question, one must first understand why formallanguage theory was invented. Elsewhere the argument has been made (Berwick, 1989) that it is rash to exped a complex biological system such as human language to abide by elegant rnathematicaI rules such as those that define the Chornsky hierarchy of finite-state, contexrfree, context-sensitive, and Turing compiere (arbitrary programming) languages. The Chomsky hierarchy itself is the wrong way to size up natural languages: Languages simply don't fall neatly into one of these dasses. If that is so for human languages, then it is doubly so for DNA: Indeed, as we discuss Iater, although there is at least some new support for an elegant algebraic description for the U care" of natural Ianguage syntax, in this regard at least, DNA seems more complex than naturallanguages.
Formal Description oi Transcription
There have been some efforts (see Searls, 1993 , for a particularly illuminating and insightful study) to detennine whether DNA, tRNA, their various substructures, or transcription machinery itself falls inta one or another of the weIl-known formallanguage theory dasses. T0 understand the results of such studies, we it wauld da weIl to recall both what fannal language theory c1asses clefine and what role formal language theory played in aiding linguistic theory and in programming languages. Formallanguage theory was used in the 1960s to study both formallinguistics and the complexity of programming languagesJ but it has not been used much since then, because computer science has developed much keener methods for analyzing camputational complexity. Used diagnostically, these classes are a blunt knife because human 1311-guages da not fall neatly into any one of these classes; for example, it is by no means clear that human languages need even be computab1e, in the strid sense, although presumably this is so. Natural languages certainly contain recursive, hierarchical strudures or phrases, such as "the different types of RNA po1ymerases," in which the group of words of RNA polymerases is cIearlya substrudure that modifies different types-so naturallanguages are at least describable as context-free languages. Beyond this, however, this blunt taxonomy has yielded very few concrete results for linguistics. Chomsky (1956) more or 1ess established that human languages cannot be contained in the dass of finite-state languages. Similarly, Searls (1993, p. 73) shows that nudeic acids are more complex than simple linear finite-state languages: They encode palindromes, embeddings, and the like (with one technical caveat that we elucidate later). Though this is an interesting discovery about nucleic acids, and though it does suggest that pattern-matching techniques for analyzing sequences will have to do more than just look at linear models, again it is important to ask whether we gain by this any new insight. Searls (1993) himself notes that it does not gain us much. The real question is whether formal language theory could ever hope to tell us much.
The answer to this last question for linguistic theory has been plain. Beyond Chomsky's original discovery (1956) , forrnallanguage theory has not contributed substantially ro our understanding of human language strudure. Chomsky showed that linear analysis does not suffice to model human language; we need at least some notion of hierarchy. (In a later sedion, we show just what kind of hierarchy is required). The problem with going beyond this is that the formal language theory classes do not correspond to human languages. An infinite number oE context-free (stricHy hierarchical) languages are not natural languages, and these include sequences found in nucleic acids. For instance, consider the example that Searls (1993) uses to show that nudeic acid sequences are not purely linear, or finite-state: palindromes, or mirror-image, nucleic acid sequences. Such sequences are very easily generated by simple first-in, first-out push-down stacks-like placing a pile of dinner plates one on top of anorher and then rernoving the last one put on first-so one might exped to find such patterns, in the form W 1 W z W 3 W3 W2 W 1 or a nested dependency, in human languages. lnstead, we find that a pattern more commonly found in natural languages, as in German or Duteh, is the opposite of push-down stack order-that is, the pattern W 1 W2W3Wl W2W3 er an interseeted dependency. Evidently, this int-ersected pattern can also be found in sorne of the substructures of gene regulation. In this sense, nucleic acids patterns are not like natural languages-they conrain more than do natural languages. Similarly, computer programming languages such as Fortran are syntadically context-free yet are certainly not naturallanguages; unlike natural languages, they require explidt instruetion to leam, as any beginning programmer could tell you.
Of course, there also 1S no reason to believe that natural languages are some subset of the context-free languages. In hindsight, formal language theory turned out to be eminently helpful in describing prograrnming Ianguages but not natural languages. One might then wander why fonnal language theory was wheeled out at an to attack the problem of natural languages. Ihis appears to be simply an instance of the "Iamplight faHacy"-looking where the mathematical light shines brightest-as is discussed elsewhere (Berwick and Weinberg, 1979) : Researchers turned to fannallanguage theory because it had clean mathematical properties and none oE the unruly tangles of human language.
This aesthetic urge still surfaces even in the recent fonnal demonstrations about nudeic acids mentioned earlier. Most commonly, the argument runs this way: (I) We isolate same subser paUem in, say, English; (2) we show that this subset pattern has propedy P; and (3) we conclude therefore that English has property P. For example, for nucleic acid sequences, we might point out, as Searls does, that they contain palindrome sequences (step 1). Because palindromes cannot be generated by any finite-state cr purely linear automaton, but can be generated as a strictly context-free language, we cauld, following step 2, identify non-coniext-free as the property P we want to isolate. Finally, according to step 3 of the argument, we condude nudeic acid sequences are not finite-state. However, this argument is flawed: Whereas this subset oE the nucleic acid sequences is not finite-state, it does not follow that the entire system is not finite-state. T0 explain further, note that the language of all possible nucleotide sequences of A, T, G, C-that is, the language I;1fo defined over the alphabet A, T, G, C-is certainly a regular or finite-state Ianguage but just as surely contains palindrome sequences, because it contains all possible sequences. Ta make the three-step argument apply, one must intersect the language studied-English or nueleic acid sequences-with some specially constructed filter designed to pick out just those sequences we know to be palindromes. OE course, this filter itself must be finite-state, and we must show that the filtering operation also is finite-state or regular (in the usual prooEs, one can use set interseetion as the filter because finite-state languages are closed under intersection), otherwise, we could introduce spurious non-finite-state complexity. To be sure, this point about subset properties is not easy to see. In fact, even Chomsky's original demonstration that English is not finite-state (1956) suffered frorn exactly this fallacy: Chomsky demonstrated that English contained patterns that were not finite state but did not precisely speIl this proof out via interseetion with an English-like "test pattern" so that the proof would apply formally. At least on first glance, then, Searls's demonstration (1993) that DNA is not context-free contains the same problems. However, it is usually easy to patch such proofs, so this is not meant as a damning critique. Rather, we should remain aware that it is too easy to single out mathematical purity at the expense of biological reality: Formal language theory does not naturally correspond to the theory of human languages, and we should not expect it to.
The Case of Hidden Markov Models
Another lesson to be leamed from the lamplight fallacy relates to currently popular methods such as neural networks and hidden Markov models for discovering structure in sequence data. Here too one roust be extremely careful in considering the assumptions about sequence or linguistic struclure that these models make; otherwise, one will get back only what these models are able to find.
Consider the case of hidden Markov models (HMMs). These are a subcase of the finite-state languages (Le., a linear sequence of states) but with the addition of probabilities on state transitions (which are hidden from our explicit view; hence the term) and associated probabilities on the act:ual output letters (e.g., the base alphabet) that are observed. The rough idea behind the HMM method is an update "leaming" loop based on Bayes's rule: Start with some prior estirnate of the hidden transition probabilities between states (say, a uniform one that assigns equal probabilities to a11 transitions) and then update those probabilities based on counting the sequences that are aetually found, as opposed to those that are not found. (The exact method uses the Dempsrer-Shafer expedahon maximization, or EM, algorithm.) After some initial set of sequence data has been processed in this way, we arrive at same "finar estimate of the hidden state transitions., which then can presumably be used as a more accurate reflection of the "true" model underlying the sequenee generation.
T0 understand what HMMs can buy us in both the linguistic and the molecular biology worlds, we must understand their limiHng assumpHons. First, HMMs make striet assumptions about the generative processes creaHng the observed nudeotide sequence-narnely, that ie is a linear, memoryless process. Clearly, this does not encompass the long-distance cuHing and pasting oE inrron and extron machinery, let alone more complex transcripHon prograrns. Thus. HMMs can discover linear patterns or classincations, but we cannot exped them co discover the transcription "prograrn" because HMMs cannot even represent such sophisticated properties. Further, the EM search method has Hs own limitations: 1t is a local-gradient-ascent, or hill-clirnbing system; the probability esHmation algorithm tries locally to improve its current esnmate based on where it currenHy is in a search space. Such an algorithm is guaranteed to find a maximum, or best estimate, but only a local maximum. JE the search space contains sharp ridges or peaks, then the algorithm can get stuck there (one reason why heuristics and parallel search methods such as those described in chapter 3 often are appealed to).
Not surprisingly, then, for natural languages, HMMs have been most successfully used for precisely those representations that are linear-namely, sound sequences. They are used for speech recognition because, for the most part, one single articulated sound depends on just the one or two sounds preceding it. For more complex linguisticdescriptions that go beyond 10eal linear descriptions, HMMs perfonn much worse. For example, consider a sentence such as, ''How many guys do you think were arrested7" (in which guys and were must both be plural, we say that they agree in number). Note the problem with a sentenee that violates this constraint, such as "How many guys do you think was arrested?" Here, there 1s a relation between gUl/S (the subject) and were or was (the verb) separated by a lang distanee. The whole point of modem transformational grammar (indeed, an modem grarnmatical theories) is to propose descriptive levels where these two elements are brought inro adj acency (so rhat their features can be checked for agreement). In this case, Chomsky's modem transforrnational theory posits an unpronounced element (seen in the representaHon, but not heard) thar serves as the objed of arresfed and is Hnked ro guys: "How many gUYSi do you think were arresred [emptyJt (where the index i indicates the link). Using this representation the verb form were and the word guys are adjacent to one another.
However, the operation that puts them together-a transformation-is not linear or loeal: The single transformaHonal operation in current linguistic theory says that one can move a phrase such as many guys anywhere. This is beyond the descriptive power of HMMs, because HMMs, by definition, describe memoryles5 processes and, in an example such as this, one has in effect "remembered Jl the position of the objeet of arrested so as to link it arbitrarily far away from the position where many guys adually is spelled out. Thus, we would not exped HMMs to provide a good discovery procedure for such linguistic relations.
One way [0 shore up the weaknesses of linear HMMs is to add same noHon of hierarchical patterns. This has been affeded in the basic EM algo.
rithm and is used also in hierarchical pattern-matching algorithms; for natural languages, the analog is to use stochastic context-free grammars. However, here tao one can show that these methods work mostly to the extent that the right hierarchical structure is prebuilt into thern. The "topology" of the relations-what variable is linked to what other variable-must be understood in advance; otherwise, the search algorithm will not find the correet representation for uso For instance, it can be shown that the EM algorithm simply will not find the right strudure for a simple phrase such as walking on air (the true strueture being a verb phrase in the form verb-prepositional phrase, wHh the prepositional phrase subtree consisting of the preposHion on followed by the noun air). Instead, it will converge to a local minimum, wherein the verb is clustered erroneously with the preposition as a unit, apart from the noun air. If one examines more closely just why this is so, it turns out that the context-free rule space is not searched completely by the HMM algorithm; instead, there are two "peaks" or loeal maxima that force the system to cluster either the verb with the preposition first (the wrong result) or the preposition with the noun (the right result), and most of the space leads one to the first, erroneous conclusion. This search space is simply the wrang one to look at. Put another way, context-free rules seem to be the wrang represen ration to describe the linguistic relations in this case, and therefore no amount of clever searching can repair the representational defect. The right move is to use the corred representation from the start, to say that phrases consist of a particular grammatical relation-the funetion-argument relation (the relation between the verb walking and its objeet, such as the whole unit 0/1 air; or the relation between apreposition such as on and its objed, such as air. As usual in artificial intelligence, finding the correct representation is 90 percent or more of the battle; it is the cornerstone of building theories. The search engine is secondary.
Turning now to the biological world, the same morals carry over. HMMs can find only linear patterns. Stochastic context-free grarnmars are far too broad a dass of hierarchical patterns, so it is likely that search engines grounded on these will miss important transcription programs. What we need to understand first is the vocabulary of the transcription programs before we go looking for the programs themselves. It is unlikely that these insights will ceme from general indudive inference methods, except in an exploratory sense.
Neural Network Models
What about neural network (NN) approaches7 Here too it is important to understand what work NNs can do. They cannor work magie. Today it is widely known that what they provide is fundion approximation: Given a set of dara, NNs fit that data to a particular curve. For example, in the simplest case, it is known that a single-layer NN (one intermediate layer, one set of inputs, and one output) aetually is carrying out classical principal components analysis. Conceptually, the picture is this: Given some doud of data in, say, x, y, z space, where z is the dependenr variable to be explained in terms of the variables x and y (we can think of z as the nucleotide sequence and x and )j as fadors that account for the observecl sequence), then the network leaming algorithrn finds two things. First, it finds two axes-the principal cornponents and y'-that optimally account for the dependent variable z. These camponents correspond to the NN "units" or "cells." Second, the system finds the optimal weights to assign to each component to give the best fit to the data z.
These correspond to the weights assigned to each NN ceii or unit.
In this sense, NNs are doing statistical curve fitting. As staHsticians know, one cannot build a good statistical model out of thin air: One has to know something about which variables might be related to which other variables. IE one Starts with a poor set of hypothesized variables x and y to explain z, then the NN search method cannot save uso For instance, iE these are (obviously) poor descriptors such as say, the nurnber of stop sequences, then no amount of NN leaming can inform us adequately. In this sense, like HMMs, NNs can greatly help us explore aspace of possible theories and can be extraordinarily efficient search engines for finding patterns in sequence data. Nonetheless, in the area oE naturallanguages, NNs have not proved 1:0 be very useful except in the same places HMMs have been-for instance, in building systems that leam how to map text to speech. This is troe, as it is for HMMs, because the topology of simple NNs best refleets the literally linear properlies of a spoken sound sequence. Though there have been aHempts to caprure some of the hierarchical srrudure of human language via such networks (using recurrent [te., recursive or reentrant] nets), such attempts have been generally unsuccessful. 1f it is rrue that genetic transcriplion is far more sophisticated than natural language-as we show in the next seclion-then this resuIt means that NNs will never give us the correct answers about hanscriplion. Whai: is needed is a new theory about the space of i:ranscription programming guage construds.
In surn, NN leaming algorithms can be efficient search engines for existing theories about linear language or nudeotide sequences and transcripHon, but their value for higher-order naturallanguage or sequence constructs is more dubious. NNs can suggest possibly valuable new cornbinations of proposed theoretical variables, just as does principal components analysis does. However, NNs cannot invent new theoreHcal variables out of whole cloth. Once again, starting with the corred representations, the right search spaces, is fhe most importanr fador.
THE SIMPLICITY OF NATURAL LANGUAGES AND THE COMPLEXITY OF GENETIC LANGUAGE
If nal:urallanguages and the language of the genes are not formallanguages, then what are they? We have mentioned several times now that both nucleotide sequenees and the transcription machinery itself seem more akin to a programrning language than to naturallanguages, and that narurallanguages may be mueh simpler than the language of the genes. In this sedion, we show exacHy how simple naturallanguages may be-specifically, that naturallanguage syntax might be grounded on just a single, simple, computational combinatorial operation. Further, this operation, which seems central to all grammatical relations, does not seem to be diredly refleeted in the language of the genes.
Natural Grammatical Relations
Let us begin by defining what we mean by natural grammatical relations, the relationships that natural language syntax does seem to use. Surprisingly, there seem to be relatively few eentral relations (perhaps only four), defined over a loeal domain of binary branehing tree structures. This constraint is interesting because, of course, given arbitrary tree structures-such as those available if we posited arbitrary hierarchical relationships-there could just as well be an infinite number of distinct grammatical relations. Yet most of these are not ever used in natural languages. For instance, we could weil imagine that there is a relation between, say, the subject and the objed of a sentence. Indeed, if we adopred an HMM or a context-free grammar model, there is nothing at all to block such a relationship. It is in trus sense rhat HMMs and grarnmars are too general and therefore cannot explain why natural languages are the way they are rather than some other way. Still worse, from the point of view of discovery procedures, is the fact that search algorithms that use only the space of possibilities defined by HMMs or grammars use the wrong space. What kind of space is right then? Here we can follow recent work of Epstein (1995) . The basic natural grammatical relations are perhaps best exemplified by a simple picture, where X and Y denore nodes or entire subtrees or phrases, such as sentences, noun phrases, or prepositional phrases. We first note that the configurations are all binary branching (not a necessary property of tree structures generally).
Reviewing the configurations in figure 15 .3, the first relation is essentially that cf verb-objed, or preposition-objed (e.g., ate iee cream or 011 the fable); more generally, this is the function-argument relation. The second relation is almost that of tr:ee dominance, which is essential for hierarchical description, as in a phrase such as ate ice cream, where the entire phrase is a verb phrase, denoted by the tree node YP, and Y is a subpart of the rree-in this case, ice cream. This is adually the notion "head-of": Note that perhaps the most prominent property of a phrase-its type-depends on the feature propagated or inherited from the word that heads it up. Far example, a verb phrase such as ate lee cream is buHt around a scaffolding that consists of first a verb: That is, we rnay think of the lexical property of the verb as being propagated up from Y co YP (= a verb phrase, or VP) in the figure 15.3. In this sense, this second relation defines the kinds 01 phrases that one can find in a language.
The third relation may be more unfamiliar to nonlinguistic readers but is, in fact, one of the most important in natural language syntax: It is dubbed constifuent command, or c-command: Anode X c-comrnands anode (phrase) Y just in case the first branching node that dominates X also dominates Y. In our picture, X does c-command Y (because if we go up to the first branching node that dominates X, we find that this dominates Y), but Y does not c-command X (so the relation is not symrnetrical). Intuitively, c-command is the notion of scope in natural language, similar to the notion of scope in logical calculi or programming languages: C-command clefines the domain over which a variable can be bound. In naturallanguages, this corresponds to sentences such as 'Whorn did lohn think that Mary saw7" which can be rendered roughly as, "For which z, z aperson, did John think that Mary saw z7" where the variable z is Iinked to whom. Note that iE one drew out the syntacl:ical strudure for this sentence, we would have sornething akin to figure 15.4, wherein the variable z is c-commanded by whom. Because this kind of linking shows up again and again in modem linguistic theory as the foundaHon of what used to he called transformations, one can see that this connguraHon is an important one. These basic relations-funcHon-argument.
head-of, and c-command-seem to be the primitive building blocks for all other linguistic relationships.
Explaining the "Natural" Grammatical Relationships
We next show, following Epstein (1995) , that these basic relationships all are accounted for by a single elementary computational operation based on the adjacent concatenation of tree structures. (The syntactical reflex of this idea was first proposed by Epstein (1995] .) Note that this is a "natural" result in
The language of the Genes Figure 15 .4 The c-command relation between whom and the (unpronounced) variable z, the object of see, is like the relationship between a quantifler and the variable H binds.
the sense that we know, on independent grounds, that human language syntadical structure is treelike (rather than purely linear, like beads on a string). Note also that iE this result is correct, it automatically explains why HMM models based on linear concatenaHon do not do a very good job of accounting for human syntax. The central idea here is that hierarchical concatenaHon is the chief operation we need to derive natural language sentences. To show how this works, let us see how a sentence such as "John likes the ice cream" might be derived.
Hierarchical Concatenation
Let us first describe the concatenation operation itself. It is simply a bottom-up tree composition: We take two subtrees, X and Y, and "glue" them together, forming a new larger tree in a special way: Either the features of X or the features of Y are propagated to the new larger tree, forming anode of either type XP or YP. For example, suppose we have a verb eat (adually a subtree), and a subtree corresponding to the ice cream (a noun phrase, or NP). We combine these to form a VP. This abstrad combination oE X and Yas weB as the specific example combining a verb and a noun phrase are shown in figure  15 .5. The leH half of the figure shows the two initial subtrees, drawn as triangles. The first triangle consists of the verb; the second consists of the noun phrase. The right half of the figure shows the result of the combinatory operation that glues these two triangles into a single larger one: (1) The features of the verb subtree are propagated up to a new node, the verb phrase (VP) node, that is the rool: or top of the new larger triangle, labeled Z; (2) we represenl: this top most point via a special seI: notation that marks likes as the "head" of this phrase; (3) the noun phrase subtree is pasted in place below. We club this operation bottom-up because it pastes two smaller adjacent trees inro a single larger one; H is computationaI in that we take this to be the operation of a parser proceecling frorn leEr to right through the sentence. In fact, this operation corresponds to one of the most common ways of parsing prograrnming languages, so-called LR parsing, in which we paste together larger LTees out of smaller ones, as shown in figure 15 .5,
Deriving a Full Sentence
In this view, then, the derivation of a sentence proceeds by a sequence of hierarchical concatenation sets (what were called derivation lines in the original theory of Chomsky [19561) . In this case, the derivation steps are as follows,
where by form we mean "construct a hierarchical strucrure like the triangle dominating likes": In summary, note that thus far the whole sentence is derived by a sequence of hierarchical concatenation steps, and only these.
Deriving GrammaücaJ Relations
The impodant point now is to show that if we assume [his operation of tree concatenation to be the basic primitive of syntax, then ir follows that the only grammatical relations we see will be precisely those described earlier.
In this sense, we may say that natural language syntax uses only a single operation of hierarchical, adjacent rree concatenation. Let us see why these basic relations follow and no others. The central insight is that two elements may be re1clted in the grammar iE and only iE they are adjacent or visible to each other at the time of tree concatenation: that is, at the derivation step that glues the two trees together. What visible means is this: Let us say that a tree such as the noun phrase fhe guys, ordinarily 
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represented as in figure 15 .6, is represented by the following set of ferms (following Epstein, 1995) :
Noun phrase = {Determiner-the, {Detenniner-the, Noun-guys}} Figure 15 .6 shows that the tree or noun phrase corresponding to the guys was built out of the composition operation that pasted together the and guys, forming a new tree with a new root (topmost) node. Initially, the was simply the set (subtree) {Determiner-the}, where we have tacked on the syntadical category Determiner for ease of reading. Similarly, guys was the set (subtree) {Noun-guys}. The concatenation operation is as described previously, and we seled one of the two combines as the name of the new root tree. We now propose simply that two syntaetical elements (i.e., 
hierarehieal struernres, trees) can enter into a grammatical relation if and only if there i5 same point in a derivation (sequenee of coneatenations) at which bofh trees af whieh bofh trees are made eonneeted terms (members) of the same common subtree (via the eoncatenation operation).
For example, in our figure, note that the and guys can enter into a common gramrnatical relation because they are both terms of same other set at the time of their concatenation, and they are diredly related via concatenateviz., the set that represents the noun phrase. This relation is, of course, simply the sister-of relation described in figure 15 .3 (and also described as the juncfion-argumenf relation).
The same property holds for the other two basic grammatical relations mentioned. For the head-of relation, note that in the mother tree {{the, {Determiner-fhe, Noun-guys}}, the first term in the set, fhe, can, by defininon, be related to either of the other two terms: In other words,. the root node can be related to either of its immediate daughters. However, this is just ehe head-of relation, as in ngure 15.3. For c-comrnand, note that X and Yare hierarchically concatenated; then X c-cornrnands a11 the elements (terms) of y. (concatenated out of two partst guys was not part of that set of terms. In this way, the asymmetrical nature of c-cornmand is derived.
In contrast, certain relations can neuer obtain: For example, because the ice-cream and the guys are never concatenated together direetly but only after trees above them have been built, there can be no grammatical relation that holds berween subjeds and objeds, as we find to be [he case in natural languages. Note that there is no logicaJ reason this should be so otherwise, unless we assurne some fundamental constraint such as the concal:enal:ion operation. In other words, in a general context-free system, we can easily write a grammar that relates subjeets and objects. Why we da not find any such relations remains a mystery, unless there is a more fundamental constraint that underlies naturallanguages. As we have sketched, this law seems to be a simple one: Natural languages are forrned by a single algebraic operation of hierarchical concatenation. This, then, is natural1anguage.
CONCLUSION: NATURAL AND GENETIC GRAMMARS
Plainly, the concatenation operation is simple. It is adjacency as extended from strings to trees. Just as plainly, the proposed "grammars" for genel:ic transcription are vastly more complicated. There appears to be nothing in natural languages corresponding 1:0 splicing followed by distinct reading frarnes. Ta take anot:her example, Searls (1993) uses the logic programming language Prolog to describe exons and translated regions, which is Eine except that with Prolog we also can describe a connection bet:ween subjecl:s and objeds in natural languages thaI: we do not see. Of course, all l:his says is thaI: the constraint lies in the particulars of the program thaI: the scientist writes rather than in the constraints of the programming language itself. JE this is so, it is left: to the programmer or scientist to discover the consl:raintsj the space of possible theoretical descriptions given by I:he representation language-in this case, Prolog-is vas!. If this is so, then we still do not have any strong insight into what constitutes the language of the genes. We know what il: is not: It is not a language or a context-free language, but neither is it a context-sensitive language. If anything, the language of the genes is much more like a programming language whose constraints we do not know (or whose programs we do not know). Now, the problem of identifying a program's details from observations of its input and output behavior is very, very difficult; even in the case of finite-state programs, the problem is unsolvable unless we assume that we know other constraints (such as the number oE states in l:he program). Yel: this i5 the task that molecular biologists seemingly have set fer thernselves. Given that we currently have no general means of carrying out such indudions, it would seem best to work out particular case studies of reverse engineering-looking at transcription in the way that Collado-Vides (chapter 9) has done anä then determining what kind of computer program is best suited for describing the engineered constraints we do observe. Our knowledge here seems just at the starting point, so much so that we must amass many more case studies befare we can come up with the generalizations that will tell us what the genetic canshaints are. By way of comparison, it has taken more than 40 years to determine that, in the end, syntaetical relationships in natural languages are, in fad, derivable from a single, simple algebraic operation. We can discover what language the genes are speaking to us only by more years of carefullistening.
